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ABSTRACT 
Provision of water and sanitation services in many sub-Saharan African countries in the 
post-independence period was a preserve of State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs). 
However, as time went by, many SOEs failed to meet the expectations of their 
customers, governments and international funding agencies: neither could they 
adequately expand the infrastructure to serve the increasing urban population, nor could 
they efficiently operate/maintain existing infrastructure to provide good service levels to 
the existing customer base. Hence, international donor agencies, on which many 
developing countries relied for financing infrastructure development since the debt crisis 
of the 1980s, initially demanded for the restructuring of SOEs, and thereafter called for 
involvement of Public Private Partnerships (PPPs) in the delivery of services. It was 
expected that the PPPs would not only attract the much needed infrastructure 
investments to the developing countries, but would also provide a new emphasis on a 
proactive, performance- and commercial-oriented management.  
As a result, since the late 1980s, international water operators have signed 
management, lease or concession contracts with water utilities in many developing 
countries. For instance, according to the World Bank’s database on private participation 
in infrastructure projects, by 2005, 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had invited 
international water operators to provide water and sanitation services to urban areas. 
Nonetheless, the number of people with inadequate service levels for both water and 
sanitation in developing countries has been increasing. WHO/UNICEF estimates that the 
number of urban residents in the developing regions without access to safe water 
increased from 107 million in 1990 to 170 million in 2004, while for sanitation, the 
number increased from 475 million to 611 million in the same period. The situation is 
critical in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where it was estimated in 2004 that only 56% and 
34% of the population had access an improved water source and basic sanitation, 
respectively.  
This paper traces the genesis of PPPs in SSA and provides general trends/scope of 
PPPs in the sub-continent, and how PPPs have contributed to improvements in service 
delivery.  The paper also draws evidence from a detailed case study on Uganda, where 
water services in Kampala, the capital city were provided on two occasions through 
management contracts with different international private operators: between 1988 and 
2001 by JB Gauff, a German firm; and between 2002 and 2004, by Ondeo International 
of France. The paper makes a comparative analysis of the performance trends of the 
water utility in Kampala during the period when services were being delivered under the 
PPP arrangements, with the post-2004 period when services are currently being 
delivered under the New Public Management model.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) agreed upon by the world leaders 
at the turn of the century have become a global framework for benchmarking 
development in low-income countries. The MDGs aim at reducing poverty, 
hunger, disease, illiteracy, environmental degradation and discrimination 
against women by 2015. Target No 10 of the MDGs is to halve, by 2015, the 
proportion of people without sustainable access to drinking water and basic 
sanitation (United Nations, 2007). Access to safe water and basic sanitation 
services does not only enhance environmental sustainability; it also has direct 
and highly significant influence on the achievement of other MDGs such as: 
Goal 1 on the eradication of extreme poverty; Goal 2 on the achievement of 
universal primary education; Goal 3 on the promotion of gender equality and 
empowerment of women; and Goal 4 on the reduction of child mortality (World 
Health Organisation and UNICEF, 2004). 
Achieving this and similar MDG targets is a big challenge, particularly  in urban 
areas of developing countries, which will absorb 95% of the 2.02 billions’ 
projected increase in the world’s urban population between the period 2000-
2030. Most of this population growth is being absorbed by slums. For instance, 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, 62% of the urban dwellers in 2005 lived in slum 
conditions, which is defined as lack of at least one of the basic conditions of 
decent housing, i.e. adequate sanitation, improved water supply, durable 
housing or adequate living space (UN-HABITAT, 2004) 
There are many indicators used for measuring the performance of urban water 
utilities. In terms of health benefits, the most commonly  cited indicator is 
service coverage. The WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for water 
and sanitation, which is responsible for evaluating the progress towards 
achievement of the MDG target on water and sanitation, monitors the service 
coverage in terms of the proportion of the population using improved drinking 
water sources and improved sanitation facilities. This information is compiled 
from national censuses and nationally representative samples such as 
demographic and health surveys, world health surveys and multiple-indicator 
cluster surveys.  Improved drinking water sources include: piped water into 
dwelling plot or yard; public tap or standpipe; tube well or borehole; protected 
dug well; protected spring; and rainwater collection. On the other hand, 
improved sanitation facilities include flush or pour-flush to piped sewer system, 
septic tank or pit latrine; ventilated improved pit latrine; pit latrine with slab; and 
composting toilet (World Health Organisation and UNICEF, 2006). 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) which had been providing utility services (such 
as water services) in developing countries since independence were plagued by 
inefficiencies and failed to expand service to meet the rapidly growing demand 
(Harris, 2003). Hence, international donor agencies, on which many developing 
countries relied for infrastructure development since the debt crisis of the 
1980s, initially demanded the restructuring of SOEs, and thereafter called for 
public private partnerships (PPPs) in the delivery of services (Nellis, 2005).  
PPPs may be defined as partnerships in which public sector bodies enter into 
contractual agreements with the private sector entities to construct and/or 
Have PPPs improved performance of urban water utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa? The Case of Uganda 
By Dr Sam Kayaga, November 2008 
 
Paper for presentation at the annual meeting of the Transportation and Public Utilities Group (TPUG)  
San Francisco, USA 3-6 January 2009. 
3
manage public sector infrastructure facilities, such as energy, water/sanitation 
services, telecommunications, and social services (hospitals, prisons, schools 
etc) (Darrin and Lewis, 2002).  It was expected that the PPPs would not only 
attract the much needed infrastructure investments to the developing countries, 
but would also provide a new emphasis on a proactive, performance- and 
commercial-oriented management (Franceys, 1997).  
This paper traces the introduction of PPPs in SSA, provides general trends of 
PPPs in the sub-continent and  provides general trends/scope of PPPs in the 
qsub-continent, and how PPPs have contributed to improvements in service 
delivery.   Since PPPs  in SSA have mainly been active in the water supply 
rather than sanitation subsector, the scope of this paper is limited to the former.  
The paper also draws evidence from a detailed case study on Uganda, where 
water services in Kampala, the capital city were provided on two occasions 
through management contracts with different international private operators: 
between 1988 and 2001 by JB Gauff, a German firm; and between 2002 and 
2004, by Ondeo International of France. The paper makes a comparative 
analysis of the performance trends of the water utility in Kampala during the 
period when services were being delivered under the PPP arrangements, with 
the post-2004 period when services are currently being delivered under the 
New Public Management model.   
 
2. THE GENESIS OF PPPS IN UTILITY WATER SERVICES IN AFRICA 
Urban water services infrastructure in most African countries has been state-
owned since independence, although their management has changed hands. 
Following the footsteps of the colonial administrations, post-independence 
governments in Africa created state-owned enterprises (SOEs) to manage 
urban water and sewerage services, while government departments directly 
managed rural water and sanitation services. Many of the African leaders were 
highly influenced by socialist/communist concepts during the struggle for 
independence, and considered government intervention in the economy a 
natural order of affairs (Nellis, 2005). However, many SOEs failed to meet the 
expectations of their customers, governments and international funding 
agencies: neither could they adequately expand the infrastructure to serve the 
increasing urban population, nor could they efficiently operate/maintain existing 
infrastructure to provide good service levels to the existing customer base 
(Harris, 2003). 
By late 1970s, the financial performance of most urban water utilities (managed 
by SOEs) in Sub-Saharan Africa deteriorated to the extent that direct budget 
transfers and indirect subsidies such as non-collection of taxes and social 
security payments could not redeem the SOEs. By early 1980s, the financing 
gap became so critical that it attracted corrective action from the international 
financial institutions (IFIs), mainly the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund. The World Bank estimated that by early 1990s, the annual 
losses from inefficiencies and unsustainable pricing policies were estimated to 
be nearly equal to annual investment in infrastructure (Harris, 2003).  As a 
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solution, the IFIs provided structural adjustment lending loans, which in addition 
to supporting ‘hardware’ infrastructure projects, also required the borrower to 
take measures to correct unstable imbalances in the economy, which could 
have been brought about by external shocks such as rapid energy prices or 
collapse of export markets. These structural adjustment loans were usually 
rapidly disbursed and were often accompanied by longer-term technical 
assistance. Africa accounted for about 70% of the SOE-related structure 
adjustment projects carried out by the World Bank and IMF in the period 1981 
to 1990 (Nellis, 2005). 
Prior to the disbursement, the borrowing governments had to agree to carry out 
a wide range of restructuring and performance improvement measures not 
involving ownership change, and the preparation for public private partnerships. 
Required reforms included: (i) classification of SOEs; (ii) elimination of state 
monopolies; (iii) legal and legislative reforms to make SOEs more autonomous, 
(iv) changes towards cost-based pricing; (v) human resources development 
including reassessment of staff levels, retraining and redeployments; and (vi) 
strengthening financial management systems. Whereas some commercial and 
manufacturing SOEs were subjected to the conditionality of privatisation, similar 
conditions did not apply to infrastructure utilities (Nellis, 2005). 
The level at which these conditions were fulfilled varied from one country to 
another, and therefore had varying effects on service provision. Firstly, tariffs 
were increased – although these changes did not necessarily result in a 
substantial financial impact, as major consumers, particularly government 
departments did not pay their bills. Secondly, governments were relieved of 
budgetary burdens, although they continued to provide SOEs guarantees for 
short-term loans from national banks to cover working capital. Thirdly, there 
were staff lay-offs, which prompted staff to build up to organised opposition and 
raise the political temperature against IFIs’ interference in the developing 
countries’ economies (Nellis, 2005).   
In many instances, the respective governments did not honour their 
commitments such as match-funding the rehabilitation of the infrastructure, and 
did not follow through with some of the drastic and sometimes socially painful 
restructuring measures. For instance, performance contracts and other devices 
set up to minimise interference of government bureaucrats in management of 
SOEs did not achieve the objectives, and set performance targets were rarely 
enforced nor met (Braadbaart, 2005; Harris, 2003). As a result, performance 
improvement, such as the one attained by Sierra Leone’s Guma Valley Water 
Company was more an exception than the rule (Nellis, 2005).  
The poor performance of SOEs could primarily be attributed to the multiple and 
conflicting objectives the managers were required to achieve. For instance, 
SOEs were expected to operate in a commercial, efficient and profitable 
manner, but also be able to provide services at below-cost prices. They were 
also expected to generate employment for the citizens, deal with state-
sanctioned suppliers, and expand services to politically-determined locations, all 
of which contradicted the first objectives. Other reasons for poor performance 
have been cited, such as (i) poor initial investment decisions; (ii) inadequate 
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initial and working capital; (iii) poor collection efficiencies, mainly brought about 
by non-paying state agencies; (iv) inadequate financial reporting and monitoring 
systems; (v) a disabling institutional framework; and (vi) poor human resources 
capacity at managerial and technical levels (Harris, 2003; Nellis, 2005). 
The continued poor performance of SOEs providing urban water services in 
SSA and other developing regions precipitated bold reforms that introduced 
PPPs in the management of urban water services. Since the late 1980s, 
International Water Operators (IWOs) have signed management, lease or 
concession contracts with water utilities in many developing countries. For 
instance, by 2005, 17 countries in sub-Saharan Africa had invited IWOs to 
provide water services to their urban areas (Hall and Lobina, 2006).   
Besides the dismal performance of water utilities, there were other key factors 
that compelled governments in developing countries to consider PPPs. During 
the 1980s, most economies of Sub-Saharan Africa experienced large fiscal 
deficits, and infrastructure services became an easy target for budget cuts. 
PPPs in infrastructure were sought to reduce SOEs’ over-dependence on the 
government coffers (Braadbaart, 2005; Harris, 2003). Adoption of PPPs was 
also buttressed by radical economic theory that originated from the USA in 
1960s, which had inspired the American deregulation and British divestiture 
programmes (Braadbaart, 2005). These ideas, coupled with the 
disappointments from SOE reform and rehabilitation measures in developing 
countries, sparked an international debate on adoption of PPPs for 
infrastructure services. However, unlike policy makers in some developing 
countries (such from Latin America) , governments from Sub-Saharan Africa 
(SSA) did not take up PPPs in infrastructure out of their own choice: most SSA 
leaders embraced PPPs as a major conditionality for accessing international 
donor funds (Nellis, 2005). 
The number of people with inadequate service levels for both water and 
sanitation in developing countries has been on the increase, notwithstanding 
the participation of IWOs in service delivery under the PPPs umbrella. 
WHO/UNICEF estimated that the number of urban residents in the developing 
regions without access to safe water increased from 107 million in 1990 to 170 
million in 2004, while for sanitation, the number increased from 475 million to 
611 million in the same period (World Health Organisation and UNICEF, 2006). 
The situation is critical in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) where it was estimated in 
2004 that only 56% and 34% of the population had access an improved water 
source and basic sanitation, respectively (International Policy Centre - UNDP, 
2007). Section 3 below briefly describes the trends and scope of PPPs adopted 
in the SSA.  
 
3. TRENDS AND SCOPE OF WATER SERVICES PPPS IN SSA 
PPPs for infrastructure services can take many forms and may incorporate 
some or all of the following features (Darrin and Lewis, 2002): (i) public 
infrastructure facilities are transferred to a private sector entity (with or without 
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payment in return); (ii) the private sector entity builds, extends or renovates a 
facility; (iii) the public sector entity specifies the operating features of the facility; 
(iv) services are provided by the private sector using a public sector facility for a 
defined period of time (usually with restrictions on operations and pricing); and 
(v) the private sector entity agrees to transfer the facility back to the public 
sector (with or without payment) at the end of the agreement.  
The Private Participation in Infrastructure (PPI) project databank maintained by 
the World Bank classifies the projects as follows (Silva, 2000): 
• Operations and management contract: a private entity takes over the 
management of a state-owned enterprise for a given period. This 
category includes management contracts and leases. 
• Operations and management contract with major capital expenditure: a 
private entity takes over the management of a state-owned enterprise for 
a given period during which it also assumes significant investment risk. 
This category includes concession-type contracts such as build-transfer-
operate, build lease-operate, and build-rehabilitate-operate-transfer 
contracts as applied to existing facilities. 
• Greenfield project: a private entity or a public-private joint venture builds 
and operates a new facility. This category includes build-own-transfer 
and build-own-operate contracts as well as merchant power plants. 
• Divestiture: a private consortium buys an equity stake in a state-owned 
enterprise. The private stake may or may not imply private management 
of the company. 
Whereas PPPs in energy, telecommunications and transport sectors in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) grew at a high level in the early 1990s, PPPs in water and 
sanitation have been less common, and the pace of reform has been slower 
and harder to sustain politically (The World Bank, 2004). Governments in Sub-
Saharan Africa (SSA) were hesitant to ‘privatise’ water services, because of the 
sensitive political nature of water. Being a basic necessity, water is seen as a 
public good, and by some people as a gift of God, which perceptions challenge 
the principle of full cost recovery for water services (Braadbaart, 2005).   
Water services have got some other unique characteristics. Provision of 
water/sewerage services is a natural monopoly, for which scale economies of 
water production and network systems make it efficient to have one provider. 
Secondly, water/sewerage services has both positive and negative externalities, 
whereby benefits and costs are conferred upon those not party to the 
transaction, e.g. public health implications and environment degradation, 
respectively (Darrin and Lewis, 2002; Braadbaart, 2005).   
Figure 1 shows the number and level of investment (categorised according to 
the sector) in SSA for the period 1991-2006. It shows that telecommunications 
had the largest share of PPPs while water services had the least number of 
projects and investment finance (The World Bank, 2007). For reasons 
mentioned in the previous paragraphs, Governments of SSA shied away from 
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complete divesture of water services infrastructure. Furthermore, whereas there 
have been 31 PPPs divesture project in energy, telecommunications and 
transport sectors in SSA between 1991 and 2006 worth US$ 7,182 million, no 
divesture project reached closure in the water/sanitation sector in SSA (The 
World Bank, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Number of PPPs Projects and level of investments in Sub-Saharan 
Africa for period 1991-2006, categorised per sector  
Source: Compiled from The World Bank (2007). 
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Table 1 shows the build-up of PPPs projects in the water/sanitation sector in 
SSA in comparison with other regions during the period 1991 to 2006. The table 
shows that only 22 PPPs projects reached financial closure for provision of 
water/sanitation services in SSA between 1991 and 2006. Of these, 19 projects 
(86%) are/were in the form of management or lease contracts, two are under 
concession contracts, while only one is a Greenfield project (The World Bank, 
2007). The table also shows that PPPs contracts reached a peak during the 
period 1998 to 2001, when they also attracted over US$ 100 million in 
investment funding.  
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Table 1: Water services PPPs projects reaching financial closure in Sub-
Saharan Africa 1991-2006. 
Source: Compiled from The World Bank, (2007). 
Number of Projects Investments in Million US$ Financial 
Closure Year 
Sub-Saharan Africa Total Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
Total 
1991 1 2 0 75 
1992 1 6 0 284 
1993 1 12 0 6,629 
1994 0 17 0 1,362 
1995 1 18 0 1,835 
1996 1 27 20 1,312 
1997 0 39 0 10,161 
1998 1 33 0 2,327 
1999 5 42 82 6,488 
2000 1 45 31 8,589 
2001 4 41 3 2,309 
2002 2 44 0 1,648 
2003 1 43 9 1,452 
2004 0 52 0 4,659 
2005 1 57 0 1,678 
2006 2 48 0 2,003 
Grand Total 22 526 146 52,810 
 
Table 1 also shows that SSA accounted for only 4.2% of PPPs projects over the 
period 1991 – 2006 in all the regions of the world. What is even more striking is 
the fact that over the 15-year period, SSA projects attracted a disproportionate 
0.3% of the global investment funding channelled through PPPs water and 
sewerage infrastructure projects (The World Bank, 2007). The latter fact is not 
surprising, considering that management and lease contracts, which do not 
transfer any investment risks to the private sector entity, are the most dominant 
in SSA. Even then, the two multi-national corporations (Saur and Biwater) with 
concession contracts for water services in the towns of Dolphin Coast and 
Nelspruit, both in South Africa, cut their investment funding by 60% and 100%, 
respectively (Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
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Table 2: Key PPPs contracts in water/sanitation sector in SSA . 
Source: Compiled from Bybliss (2003);  Hall and Lobina (2006) and The World Bank (2007). 
Country  Type(s) of contract/ 
(Period in yrs) 
Yr of financial 
closure 
Lead MNC Remarks 
Burkina Faso Management (5) 2001 Vivendi  
Cape Verde Concession (50) 1999 EdP Distressed 
Central African 
Republic 
Lease (15) 1991 Saur Terminated 
Chad Concession (30) 2000 Veolia Terminated 
Cote d’Ivoire  Lease 1960 Saur Renegotiated for 
20 years in 1987 
Gabon Concession (20) 1997 Veolia Ongoing 
Ghana Management (5) 2007 Vitens Ongoing 
Kenya  Management (2) 1999 Gauff Ended 
Mali Lease (10) 2000 Saur Renationalised 
Mozambique- 
Maputo & Motola 
Lease (15) 
 
1999 
 
Agua de 
Portugal 
Ongoing 
Mozambique- 3 other 
cities 
Management (5) 1999 Agua de 
Portugal 
Ongoing 
Namibia Management  2001 Veolia  Ongoing 
Niger Lease (10)  2001 Vivendi Ongoing 
Rwanda Management (5) 2000 Lahmeya  Ended 
Senegal Lease (10) 1996 Saur Renewed 
S. Africa- Dolphin 
Coast 
Concession (30) 1999 Saur Distressed 
S. Africa-Nelspruit Concession (30)  1999 Biwater Distressed 
S. Africa -Sutterheim  Lease (10) 1993 Suez Distressed 
S. Africa - 
Queenstown 
Lease (25) 1992 Suez Distressed 
S. Africa- Jo’burg Management 1999 Suez Ended 
Sao Tome & Principe Management  Sinergie Distressed 
Tanzania Lease 2003 Biwater Terminated 
Uganda Management (2) 1998 Gauff Ended 
Uganda Management 2002 Suez Ended 
Zambia Management (5) 2000 Saur Ended 
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Table 2 gives a summary of PPPs contracts in SSA. The table shows that many 
PPPs contracts in SSA have either been terminated or distressed. Indeed, SSA 
accounts for over 80% of all PPPs contracts in developing regions that have 
been terminated or attracted disputes between the period 1990 and 2004 (Hall 
and Lobina, 2006).  With the small investment finance apportioned to SSA 
(0.3% of global investment funding for PPPs between 1991-2006),  these 
developments are not surprising given the misplaced expectations in SSA that 
PPPs will bring the much needed investment financing for infrastructure 
expansion (Baybliss, 2003; Hall and Lobina, 2006; The World Bank, 2007). 
Section 4 briefly describes the general performance of water utilities that were 
managed under PPPs during the period from late 1980s to 2006. 
 
4. GENERAL UTILITY PERFORMANCE UNDER PPPS IN SSA 
Apart from attracting investment finance to water services infrastructure, 
another key justification for adopting PPPs was grounded in economic theory 
that private sector participation would bring about the much needed efficiency 
gains (Braadbaart, 2005; Hall & Lobina, 2006). Studies carried out in other 
infrastructure services such as telecommunications where PPPs have induced 
performance improvements in developing countries have shown that 
competition is more important than ownership in explaining efficiency gains 
(Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). However, published studies conducted with 
water utilities in SSA have provided mixed results on the correlation between 
adoption of PPPs and performance improvement. Some case studies have 
shown improvements in labor productivity, operating costs, reliability/quality of 
services, and share of the population served (Kirkpatrick, Parker and  Zhang, 
2006). Other positive changes brought about by PPPs reported in the literature 
are: (i) strengthening of managerial innovations in the SSA water sector, such 
as indexation of tariffs to the rate of inflation; (ii) placing water utilities under 
corporate law and liberating it from the government rules and regulations; and 
(iii) tangible improvements in cost recovery (Braadbaart, 2005). 
Whereas several studies conducted in SSA have shown evidence of positive 
performance trends, most published econometric analyses of the effects of 
water privatization in lower-income economies show little evidence that PPPs 
have resulted in marked improvement in performance (Estache and Rossi, 
2002; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005). Another study carried out in Africa in the 
late 1990s reported greater service coverage for utilities under PPPs (Clarke 
and Wallesten, 2002). However, a study of 21 African water utilities conducted 
in 1995-97 found that levels of corruption and governance were far more 
important in explaining difference in efficiency than PPPs (Estache and Rossi, 
2002).  Similarly, findings drawn from analysis of case studies carried out on 
Guinea, Gabon, Senegal and Cote d’Ivoire at the turn of the century show that, 
on the whole, performance of water utilities under PPPs had not changed 
dramatically: utilities have continued to perform well or not so well, depending 
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on (i) their state prior to private sector participation, and (ii) factors operating in 
the external environment (Baybliss, 2003). 
To advance the understanding of performance trends under PPPs, a 
comprehensive analysis was recently carried out on data taken from the Service 
Providers’ Performance Indicators and Benchmarking Network Project database 
of the Water Utilities Partnerships (WUP) of Africa.  Although the database 
comprised data collected in the year 2000 from 110 water utilities in Africa, the 
data for this study were collected from up to 84 utilities in13 countries in SSA, of 
which 14 utilities were managed under PPPs (Kirkpatrick, Parker and  Zhang, 
2006). The PPPs were management, lease or concession contracts in the 
countries of Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Republic of Guinea, Senegal, South Africa, Tunisia and 
Zambia. The range of performance indicators used included labour productivity, 
proportion of operating costs spent on fuel and chemicals, rate of capital 
utilisation, average tariffs, percentage of population served, non-revenue water, 
and hours of availability of service per day. Using F-tests, stochastic frontier and 
data envelopment analyses, the study found that, when cross-country 
heterogeneity in the political, legal and economic environment is controlled, 
there is no strong evidence that water utilities being managed under PPPs 
contracts perform better than those exclusively operating under public law 
(Kirkpatrick, Parker and  Zhang, 2006). 
A recent study carried out by the World Development Movement found that one 
of the key reasons for lack of performance improvement by PPPs in SSA  is that 
they have not dedicated adequate funds to improve the service quality (Hall and 
Lobina, 2006).  Most of the PPPs contracts operating in SSA, notably lease and 
management contracts, do not cater for investment by the private sector in 
extending services. Furthermore, the investment commitments agreed under 
the few concession contracts operating in SSA have been revised, abandoned 
or missed. There are several case studies in the literature that illustrated this 
point. In Libreville the capital of Gabon, which is serviced by a PPPs consortium  
led by Veolia, the utility’s underinvestment was blamed for failure to connect 
new households, long interruptions in supply and poor water quality (Africa 
News, 2005; Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
In Mali, a 20-year concession was awarded to Saur (a French IWO) in 2000, 
with the major objective of making significant expansions in service coverage, 
and improving the technical and financial performance. But Saur was unable to 
raise the required investment funds to fulfil its contractual obligations, leading to 
the Government’s drastic decision to renationalise the company (Balance and 
Tremolet, 2005; Hall and Lobina, 2006; World Market Analysis, 2005). The story 
is not much different with utilities managed under concession contracts in South 
Africa (Dolphin Coast and Nelspruit) where the PPPs contracts were distressed 
mainly because the private company was not investing enough funds for 
improving service quality (Baybliss, 2003; Hall and Lobina, 2006). 
In general, PPPs have the potential to improve some aspects of performance. 
The private sector’s technical and managerial competences, combined with 
sustainable pricing policies and better financial discipline, would enhance 
Have PPPs improved performance of urban water utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa? The Case of Uganda 
By Dr Sam Kayaga, November 2008 
 
Paper for presentation at the annual meeting of the Transportation and Public Utilities Group (TPUG)  
San Francisco, USA 3-6 January 2009. 
12
effectiveness and efficiency of service provision. Furthermore, it was anticipated 
that extra investment funds obtained from the private sector would be injected 
into improvement of service quality. However, findings from most studies quoted 
in the literature, some of which have been described in the preceding 
paragraphs, show that water utilities under PPPs were not or are not 
necessarily more effective and efficient than those under public management.  
One key factor that compounds the relationship between efficiency gains and 
PPPs is the type of competition that is dictated by the unique characteristics of 
water services, as discussed in Section 3. Whereas market-competition is 
feasible in telecommunications and parts of energy such as power generation, 
the technology of water services and the nature of water as a product restrict 
the prospect of efficiency gains through market-competition. Huge investment 
requirements for installing parallel reticulation networks, and water quality 
implications of mixing water from different supply networks, place a serious 
restriction on suppliers’ competition for water service customers (Kirkpatrick, 
Parker and  Zhang, 2006; Parker and Kirkpatrick, 2005) 
Compared to market competition, tender competition, the most dominant type of 
competition in water services provision, requires a more distinct presence of 
effective institutions that play the key roles of referees and judges as a 
prerequisite for performance improvement  (Moor, 2000). However, PPPs in 
SSA were often launched in a regulatory vacuum, as many countries do not 
have infrastructure services regulators, courts specialising in PPPs contracts, or 
similar bodies to act as arbitrators (Braadbaart, 2005)  In countries where the 
necessary institutions are in place, they may either be corrupt or inefficient in 
setting or enforcing standards.  A good and recent example of the latter are 
events that led to the cancellation of the 30-year concession contract for service 
provision in Buenos Aires, Argentina in mid-2006: poor service levels, tariff 
hikes and low investment in infrastructure expansion were attributed to 
excessive state interference, poor regulatory capacity and perceived bias for the 
regulated firm (Casarin, Delfino and Delfino, 2007).  
It should be borne in mind that regulatory functions are necessary whether 
services are being delivered under PPPs or public management. It seems that 
the quality of regulation, rather than level of private sector participation, is a 
critical success factor for determining the extent to which pressures for 
efficiency are maintained on the service provider (Harris, 2003). Section 5 draws 
a case study from Uganda, which shows that performance of the National Water 
and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC) in Kampala (the capital city) did not 
improve as anticipated when it was managed under PPPs. On the other hand, 
NWSC has made huge efficiency gains in the past few years under public 
management.  
 
5. THE KAMPALA (UGANDA) PPPs CASE STUDY 
Unless otherwise stated, the material used in this section has exclusively been 
drawn from a forthcoming World Bank Working Paper on the transformation of 
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NWSC (Mugisha et al, forthcoming 2009). Water and sewerage services in 
Kampala (2002 population of 1,208,504), the capital city of Uganda, are 
provided by the National Water and Sewerage Corporation (NWSC), a 
government-owned corporatised firm, which was established by the then 
military government’s Decree No. 34 of 1972. NWSC’s legal position was 
strengthened by the NWSC Statute No 7 of 1995, later by the NWSC Act of 
2000, and was mandated to provide water and sewerage services to the 
country’s major towns, currently numbering 22, on a cost recovery basis. The 
other key player in Uganda’s water sector is the Directorate of Water 
Development (DWD), which is mandated to provide water services to rural 
areas and small towns (with less than 20,000 people).  
Since 1998, the water sector has been undergoing reform, aimed at clearly 
separating the functions of operations, asset holding/management and 
regulating/overseeing. To date this reform process has not yet been finalised. 
However, owing to the historical loans obtained by NWSC for infrastructure 
expansion, which were guaranteed by the Government, NWSC has since the 
late 1990s been put under the oversight of the Utility Reform Unit of the Ministry 
of Finance and Economic Planning.  
When NWSC operated in only the three largest towns of the country (i.e. 
Kampala, Jinja and Entebbe), its performance could easily be classified as 
being barely adequate. As the Government of Uganda rehabilitated and 
expanded infrastructure in the smaller towns and obliged NWSC to take them 
over, the capital costs passed on to NWSC, coupled with the eroded economies 
of scale created a financial burden to the utility. Furthermore, the high disparity 
in income levels between households in primary and secondary towns meant 
that customers in the new service areas generally had a lower ability and 
willingness to pay for increased service levels.  
By 1997, NWSC’s financial forecasts were quite bleak: not only was it 
experiencing operating deficits, but it was shortly expected to start servicing the 
investment loans, to the tune of over 100 million US dollars. These 
developments were taking place in NWSC’s internal environment at the time 
when adoption of PPPs in developing countries was at a peak, which were 
marketed by IFIs as, the saviour, to poor utility performance. NWSC’s 
management and other policy makers in the Uganda water sector therefore 
perceived a management contract with an IWO as an opportunity to correct the 
prevailing weaknesses and deter potentially devastating threats.  
Characteristic of many first generation PPPs in developing countries, NWSC 
hastily negotiated the management contract with H P Gauff, a German technical 
consulting firm, without going through a full tendering process, with confidence 
based on the fact that H P Gauff was participating in a similar contract in 
Malindi, in neighbouring Kenya. What they did not put into consideration was 
the fact that although H P Gauff a good infrastructure development consultant, 
he  was venturing into utility management for the very first time.  Secondly, 
these management contracts were running at about the same time and 
therefore there  was no opportunity for HP Gauff to cross-transfer their learning 
experiences.  Thirdly, Malindi was a comparatively smaller city, compared to 
Have PPPs improved performance of urban water utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa? The Case of Uganda 
By Dr Sam Kayaga, November 2008 
 
Paper for presentation at the annual meeting of the Transportation and Public Utilities Group (TPUG)  
San Francisco, USA 3-6 January 2009. 
14
Kampala, and in many cases the two service areas required different 
management approaches.  
Furthermore, the hasty procurement  process adopted by NWSC management  
had several key implications. Firstly, since it was single-sourcing, the process 
missed out on competencies inherent in the competition for the market. 
Secondly, the skills and the available time were inadequate for collecting the 
necessary baseline data for effective contract negotiation and subsequent 
monitoring and evaluation. Thirdly, many stakeholders were not given enough 
time to internalise the process and buy into the whole PPP concept. Fourthly, 
the hasty nature also became a breeding ground for accusation of rent-seeking 
during the procurement process. Fifthly, inadequate time was available to set up 
and train a team to monitor and evaluate the project.    
The three-year management contract codenamed Kampala Revenue 
Improvement Project (KRIP) started in 1998. Its major objectives were to 
improve revenue collection, reduce water loss in the reticulation network, and 
increase service coverage. Therefore the scope of the management contract 
was limited to operations of water distribution and sales,  excluding water 
production and sewerage services. The client retained responsibilities for 
financing the operational costs (inclusive of staff costs), and contract monitoring 
was governed on the basis of cost-of-service. This approach to contract 
management did not provide enough incentives for the operator to optimise 
costs. Furthermore, the fact that the client retained most functions of personnel 
management meant that the operator could not effectively control the staff.  
The ill-defined performance targets and the poorly structure monitoring system 
meant that there was not enough pressure to bear on the contractor to improve 
operational efficiency. Performance targets were evaluated on a yearly basis, 
and Table 3 shows the trends for the revenue collection function, with modest 
improvements as per set targets. Similarly, service coverage was reported to 
have improved from 51% to 57% between 1998 and 2001. However, most of 
the data were difficult to verify, especially so as the baseline data were not 
accurately obtained. 
 
Table 3: Performance trends during the Kampala KRIP Management Contract24. 
Source: Compiled from Mugisha et al (forthcoming 2009).  
1998/1999 1999/2000 2000/2001  
 Target Actual  Target Actual Target Actual 
Billing Efficiency (%) 45% 49% 52% 56% 65% 53% 
Billings (106 Uganda Shs) 22,372 16,911 25,016 16,233 32,410 20,426 
Collections (106 Uganda Shs) 17,898 18,348 20,763 15,705 27,549 24,306 
Collection Ratio (%) 80% 109% 83% 97% 85% 119% 
(1 US$ = 1800 Uganda Shillings [Shs] – the national currency) 
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When the KRIP contract ended, NWSC senior managers and other key policy 
makers in the Uganda water sector evaluated the whole experience as part of 
adaptive learning. These lessons were applied to make modifications in the 
design, procurement and implementation of the subsequent two-year 
management contract with Ondeo International (formerly Lyonnaise des Eaux of 
France) that ran from 2002 to 2004. The contractor registered a local company, 
Ondeo Services Uganda Ltd (OSUL).  The following key changes were made to 
ensure higher levels of performance from the OSUL management contract: 
• The procurement process took about 18 months, and international 
competitive bidding was applied.  
• More NWSC managers were involved in the procurement process, hence 
securing better buy-in and understanding. 
• The contractor took full charge of both the water distribution and 
wastewater collection, leaving out water production and sewage 
disposal. 
• The contractor took full control of the staff seconded to the project. 
• The contract incorporated an operational investment fund, dedicated for 
network rehabilitation, which was mainly funded by Kreditanstalt fur 
Wiederaufbau (KFW), a Germany international development agency. 
• The contract incorporated a performance incentive fee based on billings, 
collections, non-revenue water and service access. 
• There were quarterly reviews, with the contractor required to provide 
process-oriented reports. 
 
Table 4 shows performance trends during the Kampala OSUL management 
contract. On the whole the performance was better than during the previous 
contract. The table shows that the revenue collection targets were met, 
although billings were much boosted by the tariff adjustments of 4% and 5% in 
2003 and 2004, respectively. The rate of increase of new connections improved 
from a monthly average of 473 in the first year to 681 in the second year. 
However, despite the injection of substantial funds in the reticulation network, 
the key performance indicator for reduction of non-revenue water was not 
achieved. Another target that fell short was connection efficiency, defined as the 
proportion of active to total connections, which shows how many customers 
were disconnected mainly due to non-payment of water bills. There was a 
general feeling within NWSC that OSUL would have performed better if they 
had not spent about half of the contract time and the bulk of the operational 
investment fund on merely carrying out baseline studies.  
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Table 4: Performance trends during the Kampala OSUL Management Contract. 
Source: Compiled from  Mugisha et al (forthcoming 2009).  
YEAR 1 – 2002/03 YEAR 2- 2003/04 Performance Standard BASE 
YR 
2001 Target Actual  Target Actual  
Water billed ( 106 m3)  1,562 1,765 1,655 1,952.5 1,736.7 
Non-revenue water (%) 44.5% 39.8% 44.4% 35.7% 45.5% 
Average Monthly billing (Million UShs) 1,611.4 1,820.9 1,818.5 2,014.3 2,006.3 
Average Monthly revenue (Million Ushs)  1,567.8 1,900.6 1,805.6 2,123.1 1,914.1 
Active Water connections  33,050 39,070 38,659 46,840 45,722 
Inactive Water connections  10,783 8,760 11,637 6,920 12,445 
Total Water connections  43,833 47,830 50,296 53,760 58,167 
Connection efficiency (%) 75.4% 81.7% 76.9% 87.1% 78.6% 
Metering efficiency (%) - actual 90.5% 90.9% 92.6% 93.0% 94.6% 
Average monthly new connections  473 525 506 580 681 
(1 US$ = 1800 Uganda Shillings [UShs] – the national currency) 
 
Much as the performance of OSUL was rather disappointing, there were some 
positive outcomes of the PPP contract. The main positive outcome  was the 
process-based learning obtained by NWSC. The implementation of the OSUL 
contract  enabled NWSC staff to consolidate their knowledge and skills in PPPs 
procurement, contract design and implementation. The real experience was 
supplemented by short courses attended by key staff on relevant topics such as 
contract procurement and management, negotiation skills etc. These skills 
became handy when the contractor demanded a renegotiation seeking a 20% 
increase in the management fee in the first year of the contract, and during 
negotiations for extension of the contract. The latter negotiations were carried 
out based on a detailed cost-of-service analysis of all production processes 
carried out by NWSC. After consultations with their head office, OSUL opted 
against extension of the contract, and finally handed over the management of 
the service area back to NWSC in February 2004. 
After five years of PPPs, Kampala water supply area was ‘received back in the 
main fold’ of NWSC’s directly-managed towns, which at the time were benefiting 
from a series of short-term change management programmes to improve 
performance. These programmes were started in 1998, by a newly appointed 
Managing Director (MD), who found an internal environment dominated by low 
revenue collections, increasing deficits of working capital, stagnant numbers of 
customers, a high non-revenue water and a demoralised staff.  
In the external environment, there were a high number of illegal connections, a 
negative public relations, and an impeding obligation to start servicing a huge 
Have PPPs improved performance of urban water utilities in Sub-Saharan Africa? The Case of Uganda 
By Dr Sam Kayaga, November 2008 
 
Paper for presentation at the annual meeting of the Transportation and Public Utilities Group (TPUG)  
San Francisco, USA 3-6 January 2009. 
17
loan. The new MD rallied the staff towards short-term change management 
programs with the overall objective of increasing operational and financial 
efficiency. The main focus areas were improving water production and sewage 
treatment capacity, increasing efficiency in water distribution, particularly with 
respect to non-revenue water, improving revenue collection, cost reduction, and 
enhancement of customer care.  
The change programs were codenamed, in a chronological order, 100-Days 
Programme, The Service and Revenue Enhancement Programme (SEREP), 
Area Performance Contracts (APCs) and Internally Delegated Management 
Contracts (IDMCs). APCs were six-monthly internal contracts that NWSC senior 
management signed with service area staff  in which many operational tasks 
were delegated to the centralised service areas, and where incentives and 
disincentives were closely pegged to prescribed performance levels. With time, 
APCs revolved into longer-term  IDMCs, in which the areas became more 
autonomous in the functional tasks.  
On the external front, NWSC negotiated a three-year performance contract with 
the Government of Uganda in 2000, which operationalised the conditions set for 
the debt freeze. This contract was renewed for the second and third terms. 
NWSC’s contract with the government formed the framework for the NWSC 
head office to design APCs and IDAMCs with the decentralised service areas. 
NWSC head office was duly declared as an asset holding authority in 2004.The 
changes in the external and internal environment of NWSC have mirrored the 
concepts from the New Public Management (NPM) paradigm with the following 
characteristics that are specific to water services (Schwartz, 2008): 
• Increasing the level of autonomy of the utility, 
• Separating regulatory tasks from service provision, 
• Creating quasi-competition in the water sector, 
• Increasing tariffs to cost recovering levels and ensuring that staff strive to 
increase customer satisfaction, and 
• Increasing accountability for the results produced by the utility. 
The results of these change management programmes have been amazing. 
The operational performance of NWSC has improved tremendously and NWSC 
has recently been lauded as a utility of good practices in the region, and has 
been working with other utilities in the region to apply these approaches for their 
own benefit. Table 5 shows performance trends for NWSC since 1998 when the 
innovative management approaches started.  It should be noted that this 
performance is aggregated for all the service areas under NWSC, and Kampala 
accounts for over 60% of the business turnover. The table shows that 
performance between 2003 and 2006 when NWSC was in charge of Kampala 
was increasing at a higher rate than previously when Kampala, the main service 
area was managed under PPPs.  
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Table 5: A summary of key performance indicators for NWSC during the period 
1998 – 2006.  
Source: Compiled from Mugisha et al (forthcoming 2009).  
 1998 2000 2003 2006 
Non-Revenue Water  (%) 55.0 43 39 31 
Staff Productivity (staff/1000 connections) 36.0 18 12 7 
Proportion of Inactive Accts to Total Accts (%) 38.6 26 21 12.2 
Collection Ratio (%) 60.0 89.3 95 98 
Metering Efficiency (%) 73 82 95 99 
Total Number of Accounts  50,826 62,348 93,596 166,692 
Service coverage (% of population served) 48 56 62 70 
Operating Surplus (US$/month '000') -300 195 500 926 
 
The Kampala case study results confirm the findings  in various literature, some 
of which have been briefly presented in Section 4 that PPPs have a smaller 
effect on performance improvement of a water utility, compared to other 
context-specific factors.  Other factors that may have a stronger effect include 
(Baietti, Kingdom and van Ginneken, 2006) (i) an adequate degree of external 
autonomy; (ii) full political support to strike a delicate balance between political 
and financial objectives of the organisation; (iii) effective regulatory structures 
that ensure internal and external accountability; and (iii) customer orientation 
philosophy of utility staff.  
A critical success factor for performance improvement of water utilities is a high 
skills level of the human resources, an area that NWSC has been investing in 
heavily since the early 1990s. Another key success factor is a dedicated, 
visionary and foresighted leadership to coordinate and harmonise the human 
and other organisational resources in order to better leverage the utility’s 
strengths, correct its weaknesses, capitalise on opportunities and deter 
potentially devastating threats. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
Key justifications of IFIs to compel water utilities in SSA to take on PPPs were 
the need to attract the much needed capital financing for water services 
infrastructure, and the prospect of performance improvement under PPPs.  This 
paper has reviewed the literature on performance of water utilities in SSA, 
which shows that neither of these has been automatic for many utilities 
operating under PPPs in SSA. The type of PPPs commonly operating in SSA 
are management and lease contracts, which do not entail investment funding on 
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the part of the operator. The literature has mixed results, with no strong 
evidence showing the link between PPPs and performance improvement.  
The case study on Kampala, Uganda has shown  that performance 
improvements of NWSC, the water utility in Kampala were not as high as 
expected when it was twice managed by different international operators. On 
the other hand, NWSC has made impressive performance improvements under 
the current public management model. Although not conclusive, the results from 
the literature and the case study seem to point to a greater importance of 
context-specific factors. There is a need for further research into the effects of 
an appropriate level of external autonomy, commercial orientation, existence of 
regulatory systems to ensure internal and external accountability, customer 
orientation, human resource development and a visionary leadership.   
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